Russia

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35884547

Archived

[...]

“If we can load goods quickly, roughly it takes six days to get to Moscow. Then we turn around and come back again,” says Alex, a 36-year-old Belarusian driver, who gives only his first name. He drives the loop to Manzhouli two or three times a month.

Perched on the 4209-kilometre China-Russia border, in the remote Inner Mongolia region, Manzhouli is China’s largest land port. It has become a pivotal link in Beijing’s economic lifeline to Moscow since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

More than 100 trucks are parked in this makeshift parking lot, a few hundred metres from the Russian border, their trailers loaded with essential goods – fresh vegetables and fruit, clothes and electronics, as well as toys, according to drivers stationed there on a weekday in early May. Opposite the car park, in a fenced-off area, row upon row of new tractors and heavy equipment also wait to be exported to Russia.

It’s part of a cross-border trade stampede that hit a record $US245 billion ($380 billion) last year, having more than doubled since 2020. Much of this trade has passed through Manzhouli and headed north, as Moscow has grown increasingly reliant on its neighbour to sustain its wartime economy through the tightening noose of Western sanctions.

**“It’s difficult to imagine the Russian economy would be in the shape that it is – and it’s not in the best shape, but neither is it in a collapse – without China’s assistance,” **says Philipp Ivanov, a former Australian diplomat and founder of Geopolitical Risks and Strategy Practice, a firm specialising in China-Russia relations.

[...]

“Certainly, it’s a lifeline [to Russia] and it’s been very important to this conflict,” says China-Russia expert Dr Elizabeth Wishnick, a senior research scientist at the Centre for Naval Analyses.

[...]

But it’s a relationship that, many analysts argue, remains transactional and strategically superficial, and infused with distrust and pressure points despite the bromance projected by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin.

In the Manzhouli parking lot, the war is a delicate subject, and few drivers are willing to speak about it beyond the impact on their trade routes. The Chinese government is also tracking this masthead’s movements, having dispatched two local officials to monitor the interviews.

[...]

In the Manzhouli parking lot, the war is a delicate subject, and few drivers are willing to speak about it beyond the impact on their trade routes. The Chinese government is also tracking this masthead’s movements, having dispatched two local officials to monitor the interviews.

[...]

“If you go to Russia from this region, you can see that many young people have died. Neither Russia nor Belarus needed it,” says Alex, the Belarusian, who also used to drive routes through Europe until the war. He has two cousins, both Russian officers, who are fighting in Ukraine.

“Many people have different opinions, but the war, even the word war, is bad. Very bad.”

[...]

China’s fossil fuel imports, including oil and gas, from its neighbour have ballooned since the Ukraine war, adding billions to the Kremlin’s cash-strapped reserves, while giving Beijing access to discounted energy supplies by exploiting the closure of the European market to Russia.

Last year, China imported a record $US62 billion of Russian crude oil, an increase of more than 50 per cent since 2021, a year before Western governments sanctioned Russian oil exports, according to an analysis by the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), a German think tank. As much as 40 per cent of the trade between the two countries is now done in Chinese yuan, up from 2 per cent three years ago.

[...]

But for all the posturing and strengthened economic and military ties [between Russia and China], analysts say there remain obvious limits to this “no limits” relationship.

[...]

Their relatively recent “brotherhood” sits against a backdrop of fractious relations, border skirmishes and mistrust for much of the 20th century, culminating in the bitter Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. Today, the two countries still compete in their spheres of influence in Central Asia and the Arctic.

[...]

“China worries about entrapment, about getting drawn into Russia’s more disruptive actions, like the war in Ukraine, and the way they’ve been tainted by association. Russia is also reluctant to get drawn into China’s struggles in the Indo-Pacific,” says the Centre for Naval Analyses’ Wishnick.

There have also been flashes of rare dissent among respected Chinese scholars over Beijing’s support for Moscow, running counter to Chinese state media’s parroting of Russian talking points about NATO expansionism being the root cause of the war.

[...]

“China has paid too much both economically and politically without achieving the expected results of improving China’s international stance or easing the US pressure on China,” Chinese Professor Feng Yujun said in a translated lecture in 2023.

Another prominent academic, Hu Wei, was forced into early retirement after his 2022 essay calling for China to “cut off as soon as possible” its ties with Putin went viral and was quickly scrubbed from the Chinese internet by censors.

[...]

For local Chinese traders [in the Russian-Chinese border area], many of whom speak Russian, the Machiavellian power plays of the world’s strongmen are a secondary concern to the daily reality of trying to carve out a living in a border town straddling two sputtering economies, one ravaged by war and the other by the long drag of a property market collapse. Cross-border trade might be booming, but business isn’t.

“Thanks to the war, business is getting worse and worse,” says Li Yanshan, 49, a shoe shop owner who caters to Russian tourists.

Wang Shanshan, the owner of a healthcare shop, is also feeling the pinch. In the past, Russian tourists spent lavishly in the town, she says.

“Not any more. Now they don’t buy anything that are not life necessities. It will only get better when the war comes to an end,” she says.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35617226

Archived

The probability of a systemic banking crisis in Russia is on the rise, according to a new report from a state-affiliated economic think tank.

Experts at the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF) warn that while a full-blown crisis has not yet materialized, several warning signs point to a high likelihood of one happening.

In its latest analysis, CMASF describes the current situation as a "resonance" of negative economic signals: rising bad debts, early indications of depositor flight and mounting pressure on both businesses and consumers from high interest rates.

[...]

A systemic banking crisis, as defined by CMASF, would involve at least one of three conditions: non-performing loans exceeding 10% of total banking assets, a significant withdrawal of funds by depositors, or large-scale bank recapitalizations exceeding 2% of the country’s GDP.

None of those conditions have been met so far, but the underlying risks are steadily growing, the report says.

[...]

The Russian Central Bank, which has maintained a tight monetary policy to combat inflation, acknowledges that high interest rates are putting strain on the financial system.

Corporate borrowers are increasingly struggling to service their debt, while households are accumulating bad loans at a growing pace.

[...]

In a recent financial stability report, the Central Bank identified corporate credit risk and consumer over-indebtedness as two of the six primary vulnerabilities in the financial system. It noted a marked increase in the cost of credit risk and a deterioration in repayment rates, particularly among retail borrowers.

[...]

Some of Russia’s largest corporations are already feeling the pressure. The Central Bank reports that 13 of the country’s 78 largest firms now earn less in profits than they owe in interest — an unsustainable dynamic if high rates persist.

[...]

Russia has weathered banking crises before, most recently in 2014-2015, when a crash in oil prices and Western sanctions over the annexation of Crimea sparked a deep financial shock.

That episode was successfully predicted by CMASF’s early-warning indicators, similar to those now raising concern.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35481783

Archived

Here is the original article (in German).

China, including Hong Kong, is responsible for 80% of the sanctions circumvention against Russia, but denies any involvement.

This is stated in an internal report of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs [...]

The document states that the EU sanctions have had a significant impact on the Russian economy, in particular by restricting exports of military goods through Armenia, Serbia, Uzbekistan and India. At the same time, problems persist with Kazakhstan, the UAE and Turkey, which do not provide complete data on export suspensions.

At the meeting, EU Sanctions Commissioner David O'Sullivan stressed that China, including Hong Kong, plays a key role in circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing denies any involvement in this. At the same time, the participation of EU companies in these schemes also weakens the European Commission's position in negotiations with third countries.

The document also reports on the EU's success in fighting Russia's "shadow fleet". O'Sullivan called for decisive action against the ports in Turkey, India and Malaysia that serve these vessels.

This spring, one of the major hits of the 2010s, The Walking Dead, returned to Russian streaming services. Mediazona studied how the streaming service Amediateka, which distributes the franchise, handled the original series, its numerous spin-offs, and related documentary projects.

We found that more than two and a half hours of content had been censored across The Walking Dead universe, with cuts affecting scenes related to LGBT characters, abortion, BDSM, and the Black Lives Matter movement.

WARNING! This article contains spoilers. Proceed with caution if you haven’t watched these series.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35443153

Archived

The French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo has filed a lawsuit over forged versions of its covers, it announced on its website Monday.

“Fake ‘covers’ are appearing online that mimic the magazine’s style and shamelessly use the signatures of our artists. Who’s behind this deception? We don’t know yet, which is why we’ve filed a complaint against an unknown party. All these clumsy forgeries have one thing in common: they smear Ukraine, mock Europe’s and France’s support for [Ukrainian] President Volodymyr Zelensky, and sometimes spread rumors about [France’s First Lady] Brigitte Macron’s gender identity. You start to wonder whether Putin himself commissioned them,” the magazine said.

In its statement of claim, Charlie Hebdo says that over the past two years, at least 15 fake covers of the magazine have been posted on Telegram and X, accompanied by Russian-language captions and commentary. According to the editorial team, the forgeries are aimed at a Russian-speaking audience and are intended to create the impression that Charlie Hebdo supports Vladimir Putin.

“This is almost an industrial-scale operation that’s gaining momentum — there are now numerous fake covers, many of them very well made. There’s clearly an intent behind this, and it strongly resembles pro-Russian propaganda,” said Richard Malka.

[...]

Among the Ukrainians repatriated in a “1,000-for-1,000” prisoner exchange were former convicts already awaiting deportation in immigration detention centres; not a single fighter from the Azov Brigade was included. Mediazona has spoken with participants, relatives of prisoners of war, and lawyers defending Ukrainians in Russian courts about this and other aspects of the largest prisoner swap since the full-scale invasion began.

Archived

[...]

“We can’t even open our windows at night,” [76-year-old Yanosh] Malinovsky continues. “That plant spews smoke around the clock. When Vladimir Putin came to Volgograd on April 28–29, the plant suddenly shut down. As soon as he left, they fired it back up at full blast to make up for lost time. We’re 150 kilometers [93 miles] from Volgograd, so imagine — if the emissions were obvious there, what’s happening here?”

Despite his age and leg problems, Malinovsky personally delivered multiple written complaints to city hall. In response, Frolovo Mayor Vasily Dankov filed a report against him, accusing him of organizing an “unauthorized protest.” The protest in question: filming the video address to Putin. On Telegram, the mayor later acknowledged environmental issues at the plant but defended it as “a city-forming enterprise.”

Archived

Discipline in the Russian army has never been a strong suit, but since the mass conscription of convicts began in the fall of 2022, the military has been unraveling at alarming speed. The longer the war goes on, the harder it becomes to impose order. In April 2025, a group of soldiers fled their battalion commander after he threatened to execute them. In May, the wife of a contract soldier who had deserted under similar threats said that he was forcibly returned to the front, beaten, then put into a penal unit. There are hundreds of such cases that are publicly known.

Russia’s military prosecutor’s office has received thousands of complaints about executions and beatings of service members, and the list is growing. Meanwhile, those returning from the frontlines are increasingly being prosecuted in new criminal cases. Drunken brawls have become more frequent. Corporal punishment is now a routine part of the “disciplinary process.” The Insider spoke with officers and enlisted men who served in Ukraine. They described how commanders are using increasingly harsh — and often futile — measures to maintain discipline.

[...]

“There was zero coordination. My direct commander just didn’t show up — he lied that he had other tasks and vanished. We came under artillery fire, and I got hit with shrapnel. One piece struck my side, another hit my arm. I crawled into cover and started gnawing the shard out of my arm.”

“There were 100 of us during the combat prep stage. Only two survived. The mission was a death trap. Everything was mined, and there were no friendly forces there — though we were told they were in place and waiting for us. We just arrived, dug in, and were hit by drones. No one came to help. We tried calling for support over the radio, but they ignored us. I was literally stepping over the corpses of the same guys I trained with when we were moving in — and stepping over them again when I ran back."

“Our battalion commander was the only career officer. The rest were from other security agencies, with no real military background. But even that commander was a complete idiot. First off, he was a tank officer, not infantry. Second, he was drunk all the time — I never saw him sober. So yeah, he was a career officer — permanently drunk and utterly useless.”

When he refused to accept the post, the colonel responded: “You have no rights. You’re a slave — sit still and don’t ask questions”

“When soldiers were caught drunk, they were beaten — but it didn’t help. Only when they were sent to assaults or thrown into pits. Commanders drank too. There were times when the chief of staff got drunk and started firing his weapon randomly. Luckily, no one was killed.”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35357397

[...]

A recently published study on Ukrainian sentiment toward Russia before and after the invasion [in February 2022] backs up that assertion. It demonstrates that even those Ukrainians who had close ties to Russia based on ethnicity, language, religion or location dramatically changed allegiances immediately following the invasion. For example, just prior to the invasion of 2022, native Russian speakers in Ukraine’s east tended to blame the West for tensions with Russia. But immediately after the invasion, they blamed Moscow in roughly the same numbers as non-Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Moreover, this shift was not just a short-lived reaction. Three years after the invasion, we followed up on our survey and found that Ukrainians still blame Russia for tensions to a degree that was never so unanimous before 2022.

[...]

Our findings suggest that in times of collective threat, divisions within a society tend to fade as people come together to face a common enemy.

And that could have huge consequences now, as various parties, including the U.S., look at peace proposals to end the Russia-Ukraine war. Among the options being explored is a scenario in which the current front lines are frozen.

This would entail recognizing the Russian-occupied territory of Crimea and the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as part of Russia. But it would also effectively relinquish Ukraine’s southeastern provinces of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to Russia.

While our surveys cannot speak to how this will go down among the people of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, the study did include Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. And our findings show that the sense of Ukrainian identity strengthened even among Russian-speaking people in those areas.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35346483

Archived

At a special security meeting held on Thursday at the Polish Navy's tactical command centre in Gdynia, located in northern Poland, [...] prime minister [Donald Tusk] warned that such incidents may escalate, posing a significant threat to the nation's ongoing maritime investments, including offshore wind farms and gas pipelines.

"The Baltic Sea could evolve into a zone of continuous hybrid confrontation, similar to the Polish eastern border," he said, labelling the incident as "a direct aggression" against the country's security.

[...]

The so-called shadow fleet consists of substandard and uninsured tankers operating under various flags, which Russia employs to evade Western sanctions. The ships are also suspected of carrying out sabotage operations in the Baltic Sea.

The West, including the European Union and the United Kingdom, is targeting the fleet with additional sanctions, such as the new set of measures announced by the EU and UK on Tuesday.

crosspostato da: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35295352

Archived

Oleh Ivashchenko, head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, reported this.

“We have confirmed information that China is supplying machine tools, special chemicals, gunpowder, and components directly to Russian military plants. We have verified data on 20 such factories,” he shared.

[...]

He added that between 2024 and 2025, at least five instances of aviation-related cooperation were documented, involving equipment, spare parts, and technical documentation. In six additional cases, large shipments of special chemicals were delivered.

[...]

According to the FISU, as of early 2025, 80% of the critical electronics used in Russian drones originate from China.

The report notes that to bypass sanctions, Chinese entities use deceptive labeling and shell companies to ship microelectronics components to Russia.

[...]

In February 2025, an investigation by the Schemes project discovered that China had become the primary — and in some cases the sole — supplier of key semi-metals to Russia following the imposition of Western sanctions.

[...]

Archived

In “Our Dear Friends in Moscow. The Inside Story of a Broken Generation,” journalists Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov set out to understand how some of their fellow journalists in Russia came to accept wholeheartedly the actions of Vladimir Putin’s government.

Their friends are not uneducated Russians with no access to anything but official Russian government information. They are a group of highly educated, multilingual, well-traveled journalists who have spent their professional lives punching holes in governmental falsehoods. “What happened?” they ask. “How could we have ended up on such violently opposed sides?”

The book begins in first years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency when the two journalists are working at the newspaper Segodnya (Today), once the most popular newspaper in Russia. It ends when they are living in exile in the U.K. with Soldatov on Russia’s “most wanted” list.

[...]

Over the years and during the country’s aggression in Georgia and Crimea; street protests; the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya; the arrest, poisoning and murder of Alexei Navalny; Ukraine’s “Maidan” movement; and Russia’s war in Ukraine, [Russian journalists] Baranov, Akopov and Krutikov not only become more aligned with Putin’s positions, they break all the rules of journalism to promote them.

Meanwhile, their women friends are not entirely uncritical of the government, but thanks to protection in high places they have storied careers: Lyubimova rises through the ranks to become Minister of Culture; Babayeva is assigned to the enviable postings as head of RIA Novosti in London and Washington. Before finishing the book Soldatov and Borogan contact their friends and ask them to speak about their views. Some won’t or can’t respond; some are unrepentant.

[...]

crosspostato da: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/35284114

Archived

Army recruiters in Moscow are tricking Russians into signing military contracts with fake job listings that promise no front-line combat, the exiled news outlet Vyorstka reported Friday.

[...]

Dozens of ads seeking “drivers, security guards and construction workers in the rear” have reportedly appeared on platforms like Avito since at least March. But according to sources in the Moscow Mayor’s Office, these listings are part of a Defense Ministry contractor campaign to inflate recruitment numbers and secure bonus payouts.

[...]

Sources said the contractors behind the fake job listings don’t have the authority to assign recruits to non-combat roles. “It’s a lure to attract more people,” one recruiter, whose number appeared in an ad, told Vyorstka. An official called it “the most obvious 100% scam.”

Once recruits arrive at a military enlistment center on Yablochkova Street in northern Moscow, they rarely turn down the contract.

One man from Krasnodar said he was promised a 12-month contract and given a free flight to Moscow — only to discover upon arrival that the terms were indefinite. He signed anyway.

“The typical portrait of someone who has been deceived is provincial, naive, willfully ignorant, and one who has not previously served,” said a Moscow official.