Generate Random Data From Sound Card

- a neat hack for the properly paranoid -

Your computer is likely generating random noise on your sound card. On some systems you can harvest this noise as true random entropy. This entropy can be diffused and whitened for use in cryptography.

https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2026-March/039388.html

#Random #Entropy #Cryptography #Crypto #Hardware #Hacks #Sound #Audio #Chaos

@cypherpunk@soc.octade.net @cryptography@soc.octade.net @crypto@infosec.pub @cryptography@fed.dyne.org @cryptography@lemmy.ml

@cypherpunk@soc.octade.net @cryptography@soc.octade.net @crypto@infosec.pub @cryptography@fed.dyne.org

Al Gore Invented the Internet.
Joe Biden invented PGP encryption.
Cypherpunks write code.

Joe Biden gifted humanity with PGP encryption (in a roundabout way). Phil Zimmermann created PGP in response to a anti-privacy bill clause proposed by Senator Joe Biden.

https://www.americanscientist.org/article/cypherpunks-write-code

"In 1990, the FBI launched an over-the-top crackdown on computer hackers, known as Operation Sundevil. This was swiftly followed, in early 1991, by a proposed piece of U.S. Senate legislation that would force electronic communications service providers to hand over people’s personal data. (The key clause, S.266, was pushed by the then chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Joe Biden.)"

"On learning of Biden’s S.266 clause, Zimmermann feverishly set out to complete the project, almost losing his house in the process. When he finished his software in 1991, he published it all online, free for anyone who wanted to use it. He called it “Pretty Good Privacy,” or PGP for short, and within weeks it had been downloaded and shared by thousands of people around the world. “Before PGP, there was no way for two ordinary people to communicate over long distances without the risk of interception,” said Zimmermann in a later interview. “Not by phone, not by FedEx, not by fax.” It remains the most widely used form of email encryption to this day."

Joe Biden's first panopticon bill:

https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/266

"SEC. 2201. COOPERATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDERS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT. It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications service equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law."

As they say in Texas: That dinosaur don't hunt.

#Biden #JoeBiden #PGP #Cypherpunks #Cypherpunk #PhilZimmermann #Privacy #Cybersecurity #Cryptography #GPG #Email #Senate #Law #Government #Panopticon #Hackers #Hacking #Security #Encryption

In this paper, we undertake a structured security analysis of Wi-Fi client isolation and uncover new classes of attacks that bypass this protection. We identify several root causes behind these weaknesses. First, Wi-Fi keys that protect broadcast frames are improperly managed and can be abused to bypass client isolation. Second, isolation is often only enforced at the MAC or IP layer, but not both. Third, weak synchronization of a client's identity across the network stack allows one to bypass Wi-Fi client isolation at the network layer instead, enabling the interception of uplink and downlink traffic of other clients as well as internal backend devices. Every tested router and network was vulnerable to at least one attack. More broadly, the lack of standardization leads to inconsistent, ad hoc, and often incomplete implementations of isolation across vendors.

PERFECT PANGRAM HASH : Anagram Hash Function

#DOI https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18448042

A pangram is a sentence or phrase that contains each letter of an alphabet or character set at least once. A perfect pangram is an anagram of the alphabet which contains each letter exactly once.

Pangram hash generates a perfect pangram hash digest consisting of a anagram permutation of a character set. Each character in the output is unique and non-repeating.

#Hashing #Cryptography #Anagrams #Papers #Preprints

@cryptography@soc.octade.net @crypto@infosec.pub @cryptography@fed.dyne.org

I won't spoil the walkthrough of the appalling source code. But it does end like this:

If you’re using X_wallet, you need to move your assets Right. Fucking. Now. to a wallet that isn’t a steaming pile of dogshit.

As always, there's an XKCD to succinctly describe the situation: https://xkcd.com/221

Paul Kehrer and Alex Gaynor, maintainers of the Python cryptography module, have put out some strongly worded criticism of OpenSSL. It comes from a talk they gave at the OpenSSL conference in October 2025 (YouTube video). The post goes into a lot of detail about the problems with the OpenSSL code base and testing, which has led the cryptography team to reconsider using the library. "The mistakes we see in OpenSSL's development have become so significant that we believe substantial changes are required — either to OpenSSL, or to our reliance on it." They go further in the conclusion:

First, we will no longer require OpenSSL implementations for new functionality. Where we deem it desirable, we will add new APIs that are only on LibreSSL/BoringSSL/AWS-LC. Concretely, we expect to add ML-KEM and ML-DSA APIs that are only available with LibreSSL/BoringSSL/AWS-LC, and not with OpenSSL.

Second, we currently statically link a copy of OpenSSL in our wheels (binary artifacts). We are beginning the process of looking into what would be required to change our wheels to link against one of the OpenSSL forks.

If we are able to successfully switch to one of OpenSSL's forks for our binary wheels, we will begin considering the circumstances under which we would drop support for OpenSSL entirely.

Abstract

We show that a simple eavesdropper listening in on classical communication between potentially entangled quantum parties will eventually be able to impersonate any of the parties. Furthermore, the attack is efficient if one-way puzzles do not exist. As a direct consequence, one-way puzzles are implied by reusable authentication schemes over classical channels with quantum pre-shared secrets that are potentially evolving.

As an additional application, we show that any quantum money scheme that can be verified through only classical queries to any oracle cannot be information-theoretically secure. This significantly generalizes the prior work by Ananth, Hu, and Yuen (ASIACRYPT'23) where they showed the same but only for the specific case of random oracles. Therefore, verifying black-box constructions of quantum money inherently requires coherently evaluating the underlying cryptographic tools, which may be difficult for near-term quantum devices.