Ukraine

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Marhanets, a town where more than 40 thousand people lived before the full-scale war, has been terrorized by Russians for over three years. The town has frequent power and water shortages, and the residents suffer from regular artillery shelling and drone attacks from the occupied Enerhodar on the left bank of the Dnipro, which is seven kilometres away in a straight line.

While the town is struggling to survive, Hennadii Borovyk, the mayor of Marhanets, makes money. In a year and a half, the local “Agency of municipal services”, ensuring the heating for the critical infrastructure, has made over seventy agreements for a total of UAH 123 million, more than UAH 112 million of which were received by only four entrepreneurs, directly related to Borovyk.

NGL.media investigated how the provision for municipal needs can be transformed into one’s own business.

Загальні бойові втрати противника з 24.02.22 по 07.07.25 (орієнтовно)

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"Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant" is an enterprise in the Moscow region, specializing in the production of industrial and military chemicals. The plant is known for the production of artillery charges, explosives and components for ammunition.

https://t.me/supernova_plus/40977

56°26'44.2"N 38°13'55.9"E

Edit 2 Also consider the capacity of an unmanned Shark Aero type ultralight with a parachute system to house a valuable suite of sensors in the passenger seat, if operating deep in friendly territory even if the aircraft was targetted and shot down by a shahed turned anti-air ambush device or some other type of drone attack, the hard to obtain sophisticated electronics could be potentially ejected and recovered thus at a strategic level deterring the idea of even targetting these deep backline aircraft in the first place.

https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russian-altius-drone-crashes-due-to-unknown-electronic-warfare-measures/

Edit While not a shark, this is a demonstration that the electronics warfare principles behind the design of this EW shark are a real pressure point that can be pressed by Ukraine.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=SjkEV0XB8E4&pp=ygUUdWtyYWluZSBzaWxlbnQgc2hhcmvSBwkJwQkBhyohjO8%3D

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=d6CJtoibnWc

Also see above videos.

Amazing to see, although Super Tucanos would have obviously worked, this ultralight turboprop civilian is perfect as an ultra-lightweight electronics warfare platform designed to effectively and cost efficiently disrupt large Russian shahed style flying bomb attacks.

This is the kind of practical, non-flashy weapons development that wins wars.

Go along for a ride in the shark (I like the account name :P).

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Angsf1SWecI&pp=ygUgc2hhcmsgYWlycGxhbmUgdW5leHBlY3RlZCBmbGlnaHQ%3D

Rundown of this unexpected warhorse from a civilian buyer informational video.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=JObUKp4R64Q

"This is the most efficient platform you can buy with the 912 [aircraft] engine in it."

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotax_912

[the civilian version of the aircraft weighs without fuel ~325 kg]

"I will get to ~8000 feet in about 10 minutes" pilot on the high power to weight ratio of the plane.

This is not a "frontline" aircraft at least in the traditional sense of the word, and it is hilarious to see people bashing this thing like it is going to lose air to air missile duels or be dodging SAMs. A single surface to air missile designed to shoot down fast jets can easily cost a multiple of what this aircraft sells for on the civilian market bought in single units. This is designed as a backline workhouse designed to be cheap and scalable enough to protect cities from mass cheap shahed attacks.

The cherry on top is being able to train Ukraine's next generation of pilots at the same time. Honestly flying in one of these has to be a really special experience, they are custom designed to inject a joy of flying into the pilot and passenger, not a joy derived from the drug of war and violence but of flight and the freedom inherent to it. Fear and respect a nation of people who understand flight or make a similar mistake nations did during the age of sail that dismissed smaller nations of mariners as pushovers that could be overwhelmed by sheer force and number, sailing expertise be damned. No, the pilots will always win, kings just sometimes forget it and think they must be the more powerful of the two because their throne is chained to the ground.

A king desperately pretending he is a pilot to project the illusion of having the individual power to change the world with his own two hands. Keep lying to yourself, fool.

I would not be so confident as Russia is throwing away the lives of their precious pilots while they set a clarion call over Ukraine to learn to fly and then provide basically infinite trainer drones to practice interdicting/ shooting down all day as much as they have the human capacity to train. It will inveitably produce a generation of pilots that can steamroll Russia with whatever airframe they have access to, military or not.

This is a target practice drone masquerading as a weapon. Fear those who cut their teeth downing waves of these, for they will be formidable, relentless and highly experienced.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=nT9cH3jR5Y0

It is called a shark after all!

The Wind Rises

Imagine if you were a frontline UAV pilot in Ukraine and had turned your love of FPV racing and the adrenaline inducing high speed action of flying drones into an ability to kill... that leaving a mark on you however I can't imagine it does.... and yet had never had the time or money to actually learn to fly in an airplane and one day somebody approached you with the opportunity to rotate into the backline and learn to fly real airplanes while still keeping your country safe?

Imagine for a minute how you might feel the first time you were able to use your honed killing skills to do something even more basic and powerful, lift your body with an involuntary cry of joy into the air... now experiencing the true raw potential of flight as a full body experience.

I can see the potential in this "weapon system" to do the most important thing necessary to decisively winning a war, which is create a potential so much more powerful than violence that it washes it away like rain. To say "fine, optimize your factories to train my next generation of pilots" is the kind of response that dismantles empires...

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=W_8bszJPriY&pp=ygUWc2hhcmsgcGlsb3RzIGFlcm8gcGlrZQ%3D%3D

Загальні бойові втрати противника з 24.02.22 по 06.07.25 (орієнтовно)

#NOMERCY #stoprussia

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Ukraine has been highly successful at countering Russian artillery. Any gun firing can be spotted by counter-artillery radar, like the U.S. -made AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder, which tracks shells in flight and calculates their source. New Ukrainian-made acoustic detectors which recently went into mass production are likely to figure increasingly.

...

Surprisingly, drones are preferred because they are faster. It is highly counter-intuitive that 100 mph drone will reach a target quicker than a 700-mph artillery shell, but what counts is how long it takes to hit the target.

“With FPV drones, even though the flight time can be minutes depending on the distance, the first strike often hits,” Michael explains. “With artillery it often takes several rounds to hit the target, especially in dynamic conditions.”

Like Ukraine, Russia has been ramping up FPV production at pace, and plans to build 2 million in 2025, compared to 3 million artillery shells. At this rate, both countries will soon be fielding more FPVs than artillery shells.

Russia’s artillery is rapidly being eroded as the thousands of guns in storage are put into service and destroyed. When it is gone, the days of massed firepower will have passed. But the era of massed precision drone strikes will just be beginning.

I actually think this is a very incorrect conclusion, it reminds me of how US media would talk up the threat of guerilla resistance fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq and while there is definitely truth to it (and those fighters were certainly to be respected in their effectiveness), the reality is that the reason you fight a guerilla resistance is because you cannot fight a traditional war, and the reason you use cheap drones to do long range strikes is because you cannot protect any of your actual artillery well enough to use it in a threatening manner.

See this article as a counterpoint to this narrative.

https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fpv-drones-kind-of-suck/

All that said, if a member of a NATO military were hypothetically to ask me whether NATO countries should acquire first-person view drone capabilities, based on my experience and given the current state of the technology, I would probably say no, whether they are radio-controlled or fiber-optic. The vast majority of first-person view drone missions can be completed more cheaply, effectively, or reliably by other assets. Furthermore, other authors have noted that drones still do not come close to matching the effects that can be achieved by massed artillery fires. Additionally, experts on artillery systems consistently note the greater reliability and range of artillery.

Also see this article in Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/beyond-the-hype-why-drones-cannot-replace-artillery/

Drones are a valuable addition to the modern battlefield, but they are tools, not harbingers of a revolution in military affairs. The lessons from Ukraine demonstrate that UAVs can augment and expand traditional fires, particularly in situations characterized by shortages and static fighting. However, they cannot and should not be viewed as substitutes for the artillery and rocket forces that are fundamental to operational maneuver and ultimate victory in large-scale warfare. The future of fires lies not in replacing proven capabilities with unproven technologies, but in integrating them to create a more versatile, resilient, and effective fire support network

Otherwise I think the forbes article makes some good points, but be very skeptical of the claim that artillery is outdated and that Russia could be using it when it isn't. The fact that as the number of Russian artillery systems have plummeted frontline reports still indicate that Russians have maintained a saturation of fire at the front only means Russia has less artillery pieces but values them so much that they are using a smaller number of artillery pieces at a much more unsustainable rate and for some reason (who could ever guess why?!?!) US media wants to spin this into a pro-Russian narrative about the old ways of war being utterly obsolete....

Ask an artillery operator or expert why using one artillery piece to fire many shells is not anywhere as good of a plan as using many artillery pieces to fire less shells at a more leisurely rate. The difference is massive in the lifespan and accuracy of the weapons system.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war

One can extrapolate the same truth from what informed Ukrainian military experts in this report from February detail.

The above figure must be read in the appropriate context. During extended discussions with Ukrainian officers on multiple axes and from multiple brigades – two of which had an exceptionally high rates of efficiency with FPVs – the officers repeatedly reiterated that they needed artillery. They emphasised that UAVs alone were inadequate and that they were most effective when used in combination with artillery.

For example, artillery was effective at suppressing or displacing EW and air defences or suppressing infantry protecting key targets from bomber UAVs. Artillery was also able to defend the front in poor weather and was generally more responsive. Combined UAV and artillery operations often maximised the destruction achieved with, for example, an FPV immobilising a vehicle and artillery killing dismounts as they emerged. To give an example of the difference, a fires officer described the hours it had taken to plan and eventually immobilise a tank using FPVs, compared with an engagement where a platoon of Russian tanks were manoeuvring and, having located them with a drone, he fired five BONUS shells at them, knocking out all three tanks within two minutes.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bofors/Nexter_Bonus

https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrainian-troops-destroyed-the-t-90m-with-a-bonus-round/

The pervasiveness of the threat of FPVs, however, which can hunt while their crews are relatively safe, makes them a persistent cause of attrition. Ukrainian commanders would like to inflict casualties on Russian forces from approximately 15 km from their defence lines, with the persistent threat of FPVs forcing the Russians to move quickly rather than deliberately and therefore making them more susceptible to canalisation from artillery- or drone-deployed mines, and thereafter broken up with artillery.

Although these combined strikes are most effective, Ukrainian officers noted that they were rarely able to bring about this layered effect because of a scarcity of artillery. One of the main reasons for such a high proportion of kills being caused by FPVs is the relative lack of artillery in Ukrainian units. A brigade responsible for defending 18 km of front noted that it had four working howitzers. 152mm- and 122mm-howitzer rounds are in very short supply. Although 155mm shells are available in considerably greater volume than earlier in the conflict, artillery officers noted that they had few guns and limited spares. They also often had shells, but few accompanying charges. It may be that ammunition and spares are being stockpiled to hedge against the risk of disruption of supply during the forthcoming political manoeuvring over negotiations, as higher formations appeared more comfortable with their level of supply.

For the brigades, while shells were available, charge bags were far scarcer, so that few guns were equipped for engaging at long range. Units also almost exclusively had access to high-explosive shells and some artillery-deployed mines, with very occasional access to dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM), and almost no availability of BONUS shells or other specialised ammunition. The ability to fire proper groupings of shells was also inhibited by the fact that units were receiving propellent charges sourced from a wide range of countries, which varied considerably in composition and quality, and thus in accuracy.

While updates to the Kropyva fire control application used by the AFU can include preloaded adjustments to account for common national variants, the persistent challenges introduce inefficiency into the provision of fire support and exemplify the second-order effects of piecemeal and uncoordinated industrial support. Taken together, these mean that artillery is currently significantly underperforming, even when it is available.

...

First, the need to expand production of explosive energetics and shells remains. Ukrainian officials report that they received approximately 1.6 million 155 mm shells in 2023 and 1.5 million in 2024. As the availability and quality of shells on the international market decreases, more will need to come from production lines. Investment must be sustained in Europe to expand industrial capacity in this area. But Ukraine’s ammunition availability is not relevant if it does not have serviceable artillery pieces. It is therefore also critical that industrial efforts in Europe are rationalised to ensure a supply of replacement barrels and other spare parts for donated fleets, and that the number of howitzers provided to the AFU is increased.

In regards to fires, this should be done alongside the financing and increased scaling of UAV production, as the two capabilities are complementary. Both areas will be critical to European defence, so investing in this industrial capacity is a win-win for European security. Mechanisation is also critical to battlefield survivability.

Infantry fighting vehicles and lighter tanks are disproportionately valuable for the mobile reinforcement of sectors under pressure in the defence. APCs, meanwhile, are indispensable for logistics, medical support, troop rotation and offensive action. The number of vehicles required means that while modern infantry fighting vehicles are a significant combat multiplier, they are also overly expensive and complex for a large proportion of the tasks for which APCs are equally capable and much more affordable. Ukraine’s international partners should therefore prioritise the continued mechanisation of Ukrainian units with both IFVs and APCs. The priority for both is serviceability.

the end of mass fire artillery can be seen exploding in these pictures (most of the hot gas goes out the muzzle breaks on either side)

https://en.defence-ua.com/events/how_ukraine_freed_snake_island_from_russian_forces_bohdana_howitzers_combat_debut-15000.html

As Richard M. Swain points out in his excellent history of the Third Army during the Persian Gulf War, theorists, historians, and commentators frequently align themselves in one of two camps of explanation. Swain calls them the romantic school and the realist school. Romantics believe that maneuver can be so adroit that a discerning enemy will admit defeat at the hands of an operational master and will surrender to the brilliance of the enemy’s operational art. The realist school—occupied primarily by practitioners, especially those of an artillery heritage—believe that the end result of military operations is death from indirect fire. The more you shoot, the less damage the enemy can do. Victory happens not through psychoshock or silk scarves in the air but from 155 mm and larger artillery fires.

...

In chapter 4, J. David Pressley II, a history graduate student from the University of North Texas, analyzes the German utilization of combined arms operations at Riga and the Baltic islands in the final months of the eastern front during World War I. He discusses several tactical and operational innovations witnessed during these German attacks, which were promulgated into official German doctrine and quickly transferred to the Italian and western fronts. This return of movement to the battlefield was actually based primarily on overwhelming firepower—indirect and direct fire—at the point of penetration, not on some romantic notion of adroit operational art, mystical psychoshock of the enemy command-and-control systems, or getting inside his OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. Today’s doctrine writers, senior leaders, and those who would become senior commanders and staff officers would do well to read this chapter, especially if they believe they have found the magic keys to the kingdom in some new technology.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/military-review/english-edition-archives/september-october-2018/chaos/

https://kyivindependent.com/video/?slug=ukraines-artillery-braces-for-shell-shortage-as-us-halts-aid

https://united24media.com/latest-news/18-million-shells-for-ukraine-czech-led-ammo-surge-marks-war-turning-point-9219

example of Ukraine tightly integrating artillery with drone spotters

https://en.defence-ua.com/video/ukrainian_zuzana_2_system_delivers_scores_deep_strike_with_nato_howitzer-50.html

cross-posted from: https://rss.ponder.cat/post/222426

Russian forces have occupied the settlements of Zelenyi Kut and Novoukrainka near the administrative border between Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Donetsk Oblast and are trying to advance further.

Source: DeepState

Details: The villages are located near Dachne, where the Russians are actively trying to break through the Ukrainian defences.

Quote: "The situation in the vicinity of Dachne is dynamic and tense.

In order to prevent advances to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the occupation of the village, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attracted additional resources, but due to the numerical superiority and continuous assaults by small groups of infantry, the enemy advances through the defensive units of Ukrainian fighters, which has not been a novelty for a long time now."

Details: Analysts note that Russia has a "big PR rationale to launch a propaganda machine" with its advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. But even for Ukraine, this is an "important and principled position" to prevent the Russians from crossing the administrative border.

Quote: "The situation is difficult, and the conditions on the line of combat, existing problems and the ‘infinite’ number of the Russians complicate this situation even more.

On this front, we will still see many similar discussions, because the Russians have made rapid advances near Yalta, which is also located on the administrative border, as well as neat Zirka, Piddubne, Tolstoi, Shevchenko, Voskresenka and other settlements".

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Загальні бойові втрати противника з 24.02.22 по 05.07.25 (орієнтовно)

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💥 USF hit a company producing warheads for Shahed

Operators of the 14th separate UAV regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces struck JSC “FNVC “Research Institute of Applied Chemistry”” in the city of Sergiyev Posad, Moscow Region – more than 500 km from the state border of Ukraine.

This company is part of the state corporation “Rostec” and is under international sanctions due to participation in Russian military programs. It specializes in the development and production of more than 500 types of special pyrotechnic devices for missile, rocket-space and artillery systems. In particular, it manufactures thermobaric warheads for Shahed-type kamikaze drones.

A UAV hit was recorded in the area of the target, which caused a fire and heavy smoke. It is also known that an electrical substation that provided power to the facility was damaged. #DeepStrike results are being finalized.

🇺🇦 USF: One step ahead!

Subscribe to the official Telegram channel of the Unmanned Systems Forces

https://t.me/usf_army/662

56.2999006, 38.1444621

https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11711