cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/34918680
Since Xi Jinping came to power has centralised the state authority in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), using a mix of patriotism, brutality and 'convenient' events like the COVID pandemic.
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For decades, analysts described China’s governance as “fragmented authoritarianism” —a system where policymaking was shaped by competing bureaucracies, local governments, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), often resulting in disjointed or incoherent policy outcomes. This model reflected the post-Mao era strategy of decentralisation, as Beijing deliberately delegated authority to provinces and ministries in the 1980s–90s to spur economic innovation.
Under Xi Jinping [there] is a top-down system that is more coherent and centralised yet still allows tactical flexibility. Xi’s central leadership now defines broad strategic goals and strict “red lines,” but grants operational autonomy to lower-level actors to carry out these goals within unwritten but well-understood boundaries.
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China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated the CCP’s embedded authoritarianism on the domestic front. As the crisis unfolded, the state dramatically expanded its presence at the grassroots, embedding Party networks throughout society.
During the pandemic, the Party shifted from more direct, top-down control (“integrated domination”) to a strategy of “embedded” domination that penetrated communities in an almost cellular fashion. In practice, this meant an aggressive infusion of Party authority into everyday governance in order to mobilise resources and enforce compliance.
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By embedding Party cells and personnel into community life, the state could indirectly control society in a more pervasive way than through overt coercion alone. This embedded approach allowed the regime to marshal social forces as extensions of the Party-state.
Indeed, Beijing managed to mobilise ordinary citizens and local organisations for Party objectives and state security, blurring the line between voluntary civic action and Party mandate. The result was a consolidation of political control: grassroots governance became an arm of CCP authority, significantly boosting the Party’s influence over both state and society.
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What is clear is that Xi’s tenure has redefined authoritarian governance in China, making it more embedded, expansive, and adaptive. The CCP’s “nexus” with society—once relatively loose—is now much tighter, as Party dominance extends through networks that penetrate everyday life. This has solidified the Party’s grip, but it also commits the Party to addressing social demands more directly, since it has positioned itself as the architect of grassroots governance.
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