Op-ed by Grzegorz Stec, Head of Brussels Office/Senior Analyst at Mercator Institute of China Studies with headquarters in Berlin, Germany.
European capitals are giving Beijing too much leeway to shape public perceptions of bilateral diplomatic exchanges. MERICS has analyzed readouts issued by governments after their leaders engaged with Chinese counterparts between 2019 and 2024: less than 40 percent of China’s official summaries in English were matched by an English-language communication from the European side – and even when they were, European readouts were on average 40 percent shorter and much less detailed. This shows that European Union (EU) member states are not taking the competition to shape the narrative of EU-China relations seriously enough.
Beijing is extremely adept at and forthright about controlling its image, promoting Chinese concepts, and (re)framing European positions to suit its own purposes in order to enhance its “international discourse power“ (国际话语权) and “tell China’s story well“ (讲好中国故事). Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the ensuing geopolitical turmoil have heightened transatlantic tensions and have made it easier for Beijing to project a benevolent stance towards the EU and its members in contrast to a more aggressive Washington.
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Subsequent media coverage [often focuses] on a perceived EU-China rapprochement, ignoring the many thorny issues that still divide the two sides – most immediately, China’s support for Russia in its war against Ukraine. The fact that many European governments regularly forego the opportunity to use readouts to tell their story well is a stark illustration of how they leave China huge opportunities present its take on events as seemingly uncontested and therefore acceptable. They need to make use of readouts more rigorously to communicate their motivations and perspectives to the people, governments and other partners in and outside of Europe.
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Why readouts matter – Information control at time of uncertainty
In the absence of timely or comprehensive European alternatives, the media often refer to Chinese readouts, presenting the European public with unchallenged Chinese narratives. This can create a disconnect, as Chinese-inspired upbeat coverage of high-level meetings clashed with the European media’s day-to-day reporting of policy debates about the strategic risks associated with China. This makes it harder for European leaders to explain the need for an assertive and not seldom costly China policy, as in the case of imposing additional import tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles or blocking specific Chinese investments.
It also makes it more difficult for European leaders to talk to each other. As many member states do not regularly brief each other or the EU level on their exchanges with Chinese counterparts, other European governments use readouts as the first means of building a picture of another government’s bilateral exchanges. Moreover, unchallenged Chinese narratives leave room for Beijing to try to intensify competition among European countries for favorable relations. Ultimately, this supports China’s strategic efforts to weaken the European Union’s China policy by dividing member states in their approaches to dealing with Beijing.
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At a time of great geopolitical uncertainty, European governments must coordinate their positions better than ever before, speak with one strong, credible voice to keep foreign partners in line, and convince the European public of the need to pay a security premium they have not had to shoulder since the end of the Cold War. (Without public readiness, leaders are constrained, as MERICS’ Europe-China Resilience Audit made clear.) Effective communication is a prerequisite for this – and readouts are just the tip of the iceberg. Three things currently limit Europe’s ability to win the “strategic communication game” with China.
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There are several steps European countries can take to make their messages clearer and more forceful. Each needs to:
- Define a long-term approach to China, with clear public messaging – in the form of fully-fledged government guidelines or major policy speeches, as demonstrated by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, James Cleverly when he was UK Foreign Secretary and Annalena Baerbock when she was German Foreign Minister.
- Inform national and international audiences about the objectives of upcoming high-level meetings with China – in the form of public statements or op-eds, as then-German Chancellor Olaf Scholz did ahead of a visit to China in 2022.
- Ensure timely and comprehensive readouts after meetings with Chinese officials to present national positions – ideally with reference to previously outlined objectives – and avoid Beijing’s version dominating public narratives about the exchange.
- Invest in China-related resources in government departments dealing with FIMI.
- Brief domestic experts and EU counterparts to share insights, communicate stances and coordinate responses. -Stick to the language used in European Council statements on China – for example, the June 2023 conclusions covered issues of the highest strategic importance: China’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
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